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JOHN DARGER, d.b.a. 
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) 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Supreme Court No. 
16235 
Civil No. 5571 
This is an action brought by John Darger, d.b.a. 
Custom Drilling, to foreclose on a Mechanic's Lien and to 
recover contract damages from Elwood L. Nielsen, individually, 
and from Park Village Inc., a Utah corporation. Those damages 
arose out of the Defendant's failure to pay Plaintiff the 
amount owed under a water well drilling contract. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The lower Court dismissed the action insofar 
as it pertained to Elwood L. Nielsen personally. The lower 
Court also dismissed the portion of Plaintiff's suit seeking 
foreclosure of a Mechanic's Lien . 
. 1. 
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The Court below awarded Plaintiff contract damages 
in the amount of $9, 730, plus costs of Court. The Defendant's 
Counterclaim was dismissed, but Defendant was allowed a $750 
set-off for attorney's fees incurred in defense of the Mechanic 
Lien. 
Subsequently, Defendant Park West Village, Inc., 
filed a Motion for Amendment of Findings of Fact or for a 
New Trial. Hearing on those Motions was held in Coalville, 
Utah on December 18, 1978. The Court ordered the judgment 
reduced by $1, 000, but denied the Defendant's other request, 
including the request for a new trial. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
On appeal, Plaintiff seeks affirmance of the 
lower Court decision, as consistent with both the applicable 
law and the facts of this case. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On August 15, 1977, Plaintiff and Defendant 
entered into a written agreement whereby Plaintiff was to 
drill a water well for the Defendant. (Exhibit's No. 1 & 2) 
The contract provided alternative billing methods. Drilling 
would be at a specified footage rate unless Plaintiff encounte:· 
h ges woulc ed unexpected hardship conditions, in which event car 
h lh of 
accrue at an hourly rate of $60.00 per hour. (Paragrap 
the drilling agreements) 
. 2. I 
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The Plaintiff begin drilling in November of 
1977, and immediately encountered unexpected hardship conditions. 
(Transcript p. 13) The drill site was characterized by large 
hard rock boulders, which substantially slowed the rate at 
which drilling progress could be made. (Transcript p. 14) 
The Plaintiff immediately informed Defendant of the situation, 
stating that if he were to continue, the hourly rate would 
have to apply. (Transcript p. 16) The Defendant consented 
to this arrangement. (Transcript p. 78) The lower Court, 
after hearing all of the evidence, concluded that the hourly 
rate was the applicable billing method. (Findings of Fact, 
paragraph no. 2) 
At the time the parties entered into the 
drilling contract, they agreed that a portion of each amount 
billed was to be credite'd to a contemplated purchase of real 
estate. However, no specific piece of land was agreed upon, 
nor was a date of sale or purchase price mentioned. (Transcript 
p. 29) The lower Court, having heard the evidence relevant 
to this agremeent, held that there was no definite agreement 
and it was therefore not enforceable. (Transcript P. 99) During 
the contract period, $7500 was posted to the credit account. 
Because the lower Court found no enforceable agreement, the 
Court found that amount due and owing Plaintiff at the termination 
of the contract. (Findings of Fact, paragraph 3) 
. 3. 
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The lower Court heard conflicting testimony 
about contract performance. Plaintiff and Defendant each 
claimed that the other had breached the drilling agreement. 
I Ultimately, the lower Court found both parties had violated ce::. 
terms of the agreement. (Findings of Fact, paragraphs 6, 7 & t~: 
The Court concluded that Plaintiff did not 
have sufficient grounds to abandon the drilling contract. 
(Findings of Fact, paragraph 10) Wrongful abandonment 
invalidated his claim to a Mechanic's Lien. (Findings of 
Fact, paragraph 10) However, at the time of contract 
abandonment, the Court concluded that Defendant owed 
Plaintiff the following amounts on the contract: 
a. Amounts credited toward comtemplated 
real estate exchange 
b. Drilling time from February 21-
March 7, 1978 
c. Unpaid move-in fee 
TOTAL 
$ 7500 
1980 I 
250 I 
-
$9730 
The Court, at a post-judgment hearing on Defendant's Motion 
to Amend Findings of Fact reduced the total amount owed 
to Plaintiff by $1,000 to reflect a payment not credited in 
the minute decision. 
The Defendant had not paid Plaintiff the amounts 
listed above at contract termination, so those obligations 
.4. I 
___..... 
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were still due and owing. As a matter of law, the Defendant 
would be entitled to set-off his Counterclaim damages aginst 
those obligations. However, the Court found that the Plaintiff's 
breach had not damaged Defendant in any respect. (Findings of 
Fact, paragraph 11). 
Gardner Drilling, the company that completed the well, 
charged Defendant $60.00 per hour to finish the well, the exact 
amount that Plaintiff was entitled to charge. (Findings of 
Fact, paragraph 2). The cost to Defendant of finishing the 
well was the same, regardless of whether Plaintiff or Gardner 
did the work. For this reason, and in view of the Defendant's 
failure to introduce other evidence as to Counterclaim damages 
the lower Court concluded that no such damages had been proven. 
(Findings of Fact, pa~agraph 12). 
At trial, evidence was introduced regarding an 
Addendum to the contract, executed March 1, 1978 providing 
that Plaintiff would revert back to a footage basis. (Exhibit 
10) This document was an unsuccessful attempt to save the 
contract, agreed upon just one week prior to the contract's 
collapse. The lower Court, by deciding that Plaintiff was 
entitled to charge $60.00 per hour for all drilling time, 
concluded that the Addendum was never incorporated into the 
original contract, and was not binding on either party. (Findings 
of Fact, paragraph 2). The Defendant's attempt to ground his 
.s. 
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Counterclaim damages on what the well would have cost if the 
addundum had been found controlling is both speculative and 
irrelevant. 
The Plaintiff did, in fact, testify that 
he was a licensed drilling contractor. (Transcript P. 17 ,11,Jl 
& 32) On the other hand, the Defendant failed to introduce any 
evidence that would controvert the Plaintiff's testimony 
on that point. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
I 
CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE INTRODUCED AT TRIAL, 
I 
SUPPORTS THE LOWER COURT' s JUDGMENT AS TO DAMAGES SUSTAINDI 
BY THE PLAINTIFF. 
II 
THE COURT ACTED PROPERLY IN AWARDING PLAINTIFF $1, 980 
FOR DRILLING TIME AFTER FEBRUARY 21, 1978. 
III 
THE LOWER COURT ACTED CORRECTLY IN DENYING 
DEFENDANT COUNTERCLAIM DAMAGES. 
IV 
THE LOWER COURT ACTED PROPERLY IN REFUSING TO ENFORCE AN ! 
AGREEMENT TO EXCHANGE A SUM CERTAIN FOR REAL PROPERTY, \111[• 
NEITHER THE REAL PROPERTY, THE PRICE, NOR THE DATE OF 
EXCHANGE WERE SPECIFIED . 
. 6. 
I 
Ji. 
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tn 
v 
CONTRARY TO THE DEFENDANT'S CONTENTION, EVIDENCE WAS 
INTRODUCED AT TRIAL PROVING THAT PLAINTIFF WAS A LICENSED 
DRILLING CONTRACTOR. IN LIGHT OF THAT EVIDENCE, AND IN 
ACCORDANCE WITH RULE 15 (b) OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE, THE FAILURE TO PLEAD THAT THE PLAINTIFF WAS A 
LICENSED CONTRACTOR DOES NOT CONSTITUTE REVERSIBLE ERROR. 
ARGUMENT 
CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE INTRODUCED AT TRIAL, 
SUPPORTS THE LOWER COURT'S JUDGMENT AS TO DAMAGES 
SUSTAINED BY THE PLAINTIFF. 
The Appellant concedes that the lower Court could 
have legitimately found that $60.00 per hour was the appropriate 
charge. (Appellant's Brief p. 8) There is, therefore, 
no question before this Court as to the appropriate billing 
method. 
Contrary to the Defendant's contention, the lower 
Court did not find that the Plaintiff was paid in full as of 
March 1, 1978. The lower Court specifically found that the 
Defendant had not paid the $250 move-in fee that was due at 
the beginning of contract performance. (Findings of Fact, 
paragraph 6) Other evidence was conflicting as to the account 
status as of March 1, 1978. Plaintiff maintained that there 
was an arrearage of that date not shown on the billing statements 
(Transcript p. 70). Defendant concedes that the amounts 
. 7. 
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paid fell short of the amounts billed by $100.00. (Appellant's 
Brief P. 5) The lower Court, after having reviewed all the 
evidence, found that the Plaintiff was not justified in 
abandoning the contract. However, it does not fo~low from 
that finding that Plaintiff had been paid in full, as 
Appellant maintains. To the contrary, the Court issued 
Findings of Fact showing substantial sums due and owing 
Plaintiff. (Findings of Fact, paragraph 5,6 & 7) 
The evidence presented as to the credit 
allowed for the $700 payment of March 1, 1978 was conflicting. 
(Transcript p. 48) Defendant maintained that no credit had 
been given. Plaintiff maintained that it had been taken into 
account, but was not reflected in the final billing statement. 
Apparently, Appellant feels the Court should have believed 
the Defendant rather than the Plaintiff. The $1000 payment 
of March 16, 1978 was credited to the Defendant's account 
by a post judgment order of the Court, amending the Judgment 
by reducing it by $1000. 
The Defendant is asking this Court to reverse 
' ,,.1 
the trial Court's judgment as to the amount of damages Plaint--, 
1 1ro- I 
was entitled to under the contract. In Utah, on an appea - · 
a judgment in Plaintiff's favor, the Plaintiff is entitled to 
d ever 
have the appellate court consider all of the evidence, an 
. 8. 
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inference and intendment fairly arising therefrom, in a light 
most favorable to him. Toomer's Estate vs. Union Pacific Rail-
road Co. 121 Utah 37, 239 P. 2d 163 (1951). The only 
question before this Court is whether there is subtantial 
evidence to support the verdict. Horsely vs. Robinson,112 Utah 
327, 196 P. 2d 163 (1947). The Defendant's contention that 
the evidence as to the amount owed was uncontradicted is not 
supported by the record. 
II 
THE COURT ACTED PROPERLY IN AWARDING PLAINTIFF $1,980 
FOR DRILLING TIME AFTER FEBRAURY 21, 1978. 
The Defendant contends that the $1,980 awarded 
Plaintiff for drilling time after February 21, 1978 was 
improper, because it was based on the hourly rate of $60.00 
per hour rather than the footage rate mentioned in the Addendum. 
The lower Court specifically refused to apply the provisions of 
the Addendum because it never went into effect. Plaintiff 
testified that because the Defendant failed to meet certain 
conditions subsequent to the Addendum, it was never incorporated 
into the contract. (Transcript p. 51) The lower Court 
properly concluded that damage should not be based on an 
ambiguous last minute attempt to save the contract which, in 
fact, collapsed immediately thereafter. 
Once again, the Defendant is asking this Court to 
. 9. 
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substitute its own factual conclusions in place of those 
of the lower Court. The lower Court's decision on the issue 
of Plaintiff's damages was supported by subsqmtial evidence, 
as Plaintiff's testimony below reveals. 
III 
THE LOWER COURT ACTED CORRECTLY IN DENYING DEFENDANT 
COUNTERCLAIM DAMAGES. 
Defendant's contention that the lower Court 
erred in failing to award Counterclaim damages is without 
merit. The Court below specifically found that Plaintiff 
was entitled to charge Defendant $60.00 per hour for work done: 
the well. William Hill, of Gardner Drilling, the company that 
completed the well, testified that his company charged Defend· 
ant $60. 00 per hour to finish the well. (Transcript , p. 62). 
The Court considered this testimony and correctly concluded tho: 
the cost of finishing the well would have been the same, 
regardless of whether Plaintiff or Gardner did the work. 
Defendant attempts once again to argue that 
because the court did not accept Defendant's version of the 
facts the Court below was in error. Defendant states that 
if the Court had accepted the $40. 00 per foot rate of the Adder; 
as controlling, the cost of the Plaintiff's finishing the well 
would have been less than that of Gardner Drilling. However, 
after hearing all of the evidence, the Court specificallY hela 
that Plaintiff was entitled to charge Defendant $60.00 per~: 
.10. b 
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(Findings of Fact, paragraph 2). The Defendant is merely arguing 
that if the Court had accepted its version of the facts, the 
results would have been different. The Court below correctly 
decided th~t Counte~claim damages could not be based upon such 
speculative savings. 
IV 
THE LOWER COURT ACTED PROPERLY IN REFUSING TO ENFORCE AN 
AGREEMENT TO EXCHANGE A SUM CERTAIN FOR REAL PROPERTY, 
WHERE NEITHER THE REAL PROPERTY, THE PRICE, NOR THE DATE 
OF EXCHANGE WERE SPECIFIED. 
Both Defendant and Plaintiff admit that at the 
time the contract was entered into it was agreed that a portion 
of the drilling charges would be deferred, for subsequent credit 
against a contemplated real estate purchase. Neither the 
property, its price, nor the date of exchange were specified. 
The lower Court found this agreement too vague to be enforceable. 
That decision was in accordance with Utah Law. 
In Bunnell vs. Bills,14 Utah 2d 83, 368 P. 2d 596 (1962), this 
Court held that a contract can be enforced by the Court only if 
the obligations of the parties are set forth with sufficient 
definitness that it can be performed. Other Utah cases support-
ing this basic principal of contract law are annotated at BA 
Pacific Digest 37, Contracts §9 (2) . 
. 11. 
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There is no dispute that $7500 was credited toward 
the contemplated exchange. However, rather than give 
birth to further litigation, the Court wisely ordered the 
Defendant to pay the Plaintiff the specific amount credited 
' ' 
in currency. In the event that these parties can agree on a 
parcel of property, an appropriate price, and a sale date, 
there is nothing to prevent Plaintiff and Defendant from using ' 
the $7500 as originally contemplated. 
v 
CONTRARY TO THE DEFENDANT'S CONTENTION, EVIDENCE WAS 
INTRODUCED AT TRIAL PROVING THAT PLAINTIFF WAS A LICENSED 
DRILLING CONTRACTOR. IN LIGHT OF THAT EVIDENCE, AND IN 
ACCORDANCE WITH RULE 15 (b) OF THE UTAH RULES OF 
CIVIL PROCEDURE, THE FAILURE TO PLEAD THAT THE PLAINTIFF 
WAS A LICENSED CONTRACTOR DOES NOT CONSTITUTE REVERSIBLE 
ERROR. 
Plaintiff, in fact, testified that he was a 
licensed drilling contractor, contrary to the Defendant's 
assertion. (Transcript 7, 11, 31 & 32) It is also a fact, 
that the Defendant introduced absolutely no evidence that 
would contradict Plaintiff's repeated assertions that hewu 
a licensed contractor. 
It is true, that the Plaintiff failed to 
1: plead in his Complaint that he was a licensed contractor. 
is also true that the Defendant failed to raise this defense, 
.12. 
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affirmatively or otherwise, in the defense pleadings. However, 
these errors were remedied by the above-noted trial dialogue, 
wherein the defense was both raised by the Defendant and answered 
by the Plaintiff. 
In addition, Rule 15 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure provides that when issues not raised by the 
pleadings are tried by the express or implied consent of the 
parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they 
had been raised in the pleadings. 
In view of the Plaintiff's trial testimony, 
the Defendant's failure to produce rebuttal evidence, and Rule 
15 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Defendant's contention 
that Plaintiff's pleading ommission is grounds for a reversal 
is totally without merit. 
CONCLUSION 
On Appeal, Defendant is attempting to have this 
Court substitute new Findings of Fact, ones more favorable 
to the Defendant, in place of the findings of the Court below. 
The Defendant's repeated contention that the evidence was 
uncontradicted is without support in the trial record. 
This Court has held that appellate review is 
limited to the determination of whether or not there is competent 
evidence to support the judgment of the trial Court. Dahnken 
vs. George Romney and Sons Co. ,111 Utah 2d 471, 184 p.2 211 (1947) . 
. 13. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Even a cursory review of the record reveals that 
substantial competent evidence was introduced which can and doe: 
support the trial Court findings. That is not to ,say that 
Plaintiff's evidence was uncontroverted. It was. However, 
the lower Court, after having heard and considered all evidence 
presented by both sides, accepted the Plaintiff's position on 
certain points. On appeal, the Defendant is merely arguing 
that the trial Court should have accepted its version of the 
facts rather than the Plaintiff's version. 
Plaintiff respectfully submits that this 
Court should reject Defendant's attempt to have a second hear· 
ing on the facts at the appellate level. 
DATED: April ;;;ri , 1979. 
~·~~~ a. ona"''Scott erry 
Attorney for ApP€11aTitJ 
Defendant 
. 14. • 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed true and correct 
copies of the foregoing Respondent's Brief to W. Scott 
Barrett, Esq., Attorney for the Defendant, at Barrett & 
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postage prepaid on the ;;}., 7t~day of April, 1979. 
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